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Abstract
We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games,
namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on
the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the
set of states and a vector that assigns a real number to each element of the
partition. We study properties of the modified game, like its equilibria, min-
max value, and max-min value. We then show how this tool can be used to
prove the existence of a uniform equilibrium in a certain class of multiplayer
stochastic games.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic games is a model for studying dynamic models in which the state vari-
able changes in response to the players’ actions. Shapley (1953) presented the
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model of two-player zero-sum discounted stochastic games with finitely many states
and actions and proved the existence of the value and of stationary optimal strate-
gies for the two players. The main approach for studying discounted stochastic
games is using their recursive structure. This approach was successfully utilized
by Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1964) to prove the existence of a discounted equi-
librium in stationary strategy in multiplayer stochastic games, by Ho¨rner, Sugaya,
Takahashi, and Vieille (2011) for characterizing the limit set of discounted equi-
librium payoffs in a certain class of multiplayer stochastic games, and by, e.g.,
Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987) to study equilibrium in multiplayer stochastic
games with general state and action spaces.
Mertens and Neyman (1981) suggested a robust equilibrium concept for stochas-
tic games, namely uniform ε-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a uniform ε-equilibrium
if it is an ε-equilibrium in the discounted game, provided the players are suffi-
ciently patient, and in the finite-horizon game, provided the game is sufficiently
long. The study of uniform ε-equilibrium and its variants, namely various types of
uniform correlated ε-equilibrium, turned out to be difficult, and various techniques
were used in the literature by different authors. These include the vanishing dis-
count factor approach (Vrieze and Thuijsman, 1989), graph theoretic tools (Vieille,
2000a,b), the introduction of a modified game (Solan, 1999, 2000; Solan and Vohra,
2002), a dynamical system approach (Solan and Vieille, 2001), and a topological
approach (Simon, 2007, 2012).
In the present paper we extend to general stochastic games the approach taken
by Solan (1999, 2000) and Solan and Vohra (2002). These papers study multiplayer
absorbing games,1 and define a modified game, in which the stage payoff in the
nonabsorbing state is different than the stage payoff in the original game: the new
stage payoff of each player is the minimum between his expected stage payoff (given
the mixed actions chosen by the players) and the uniform min-max value of the
player in the nonabsorbing state. It is shown that this game admits a discounted
equilibrium in stationary strategies and that the limit of the discounted equilibrium
1A state in a stochastic games is absorbing if the play cannot leave it once this state was
reached. A stochastic game is absorbing if all states but one are absorbing.
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payoffs is at least the uniform min-max value of the original game. Finally, like
in the vanishing discount factor approach, the sequence of discounted stationary
equilibria is used to construct a uniform ε-equilibrium in three-player absorbing
games and in team games, and a uniform normal-form correlated ε-equilibrium in
multiplayer absorbing games.
The fact that in absorbing games there is a single nonabsorbing state simplified
the definition and the study of the modified game, as the expected stage payoff
and the uniform min-max value of the players are those given in the nonabsorbing
state. In general stochastic games, where the state changes from stage to stage, it
is not clear how to define the payoff function in the modified game so as to keep
the useful properties that the definition of the modified game for absorbing games
has.
Below we provide a definition for the modified game that retains the features
that were valuable in earlier studies. The modified game is a normal-form game
that depends on the initial state, a discount factor, and for each player i a partition
Di of the set of states and a collection of cut-offs (ci(D)), one for every element D
of the partition Di. In this game, each player chooses a strategy in the stochastic
game, and his payoff is the sum over all elements D of the partition, of the minimum
between his expected discounted payoff restricted to stages spent in D and his cut-
off ci(D). Thus, the expected discounted payoff of a player i in an element D of
his partition cannot be higher than the cut-off ci(D).
We then study properties of the modified game. We show that it admits an
equilibrium in stationary strategies, and we compare its min-max value and max-
min value, both in general strategies and in stationary strategies, to the min-max
value and max-min value of the original game. In particular we show that if the
partitions (Di) satisfy a certain property and the cut-offs (ci(D)) are not too low,
then the limit of a sequence of equilibrium payoffs in the modified game as the
discount factor goes to 1 (patience) is at least the uniform min-max value of the
initial state in the original stochastic game. We finally provide an application of
this tool to the study of uniform ε-equilibrium in a certain class of multiplayer
stochastic games.
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In addition to providing a new tool to study multiplayer stochastic games, the
paper shows that to study stochastic games it may be useful to define auxiliary
games and study their properties. The modified game that we present is just one
possible auxiliary game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model of
stochastic games. In Section 3 we define the modified game and summarize the
results that are proven in the rest of the paper. In Section 4 we study equilibria of
the modified game. In Section 5 we present the notion of uniform max-min value in
stochastic games. The max-min value and the min-max value of the modified game,
and their comparison to the uniform max-min value and uniform min-max value
in the original game, are studied in Sections 6 and 7 respectively. The min-max
and max-min values in stationary strategies of the modified game are studied in
Sections 8 and 9 respectively. The application to the uniform equilibrium appears
in Section 10.
2 Stochastic Games: the Model
2.1 The Game Play
A multiplayer stochastic game is a vector Γ = (I, S, (Ai)i∈I , (u
i)i∈I , q) where
• I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} is a finite set of players.
• S is a finite set of states.
• Ai(s) is a finite set of actions available to player i in state s. Denote by
A(s) := ×i∈IA
i(s) the set of all action profiles available at state s. Denote
by Λ := {(s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)} the set consisting of pairs of state and
action profile available at that state.
• ui : Λ→ R is player i’s payoff function. We assume w.l.o.g. that the payoffs
are bounded between -1 and 1.
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• q : Λ → ∆(S) is a transition function, where ∆(X) is the set of probability
distributions over X , for every nonempty finite set X .
The game is played as follows. The initial state s0 ∈ S is given. At each
stage n ∈ N ∪ {0}, the current state sn is announced to the players. Each player
i ∈ I chooses an action ain ∈ A
i(sn); the action profile an = (a
i
n)i∈I is publicly
announced, sn+1 ∈ S is drawn according to q(· | sn, an), and the game proceeds to
stage n+ 1.
We extend the domain of q and (ui)i∈I to ∪s∈S ({s} ×∆(A(s))) in a multilinear
fashion: for every state s ∈ S and every mixed action profile α ∈ ×i∈I∆(A
i(s)) we
define
q(s, α) :=
∑
a∈A(s)
α[a]q(s, a),
and
ui(s, α) :=
∑
a∈A(s)
α[a]ui(s, a),
where α[a] :=
∏
i∈I α
i(ai).
2.2 Strategies and Payoffs
A finite history of length n is a sequence hn = (s0, a0, · · · , sn) ∈ Λ
n × S. By
convention, the set Λ0 contains only the empty history. Let H := ∪n≥0(Λ
n × S)
be the set of all finite histories and H∞ := Λ∞ be the set of plays. When h ∈ H∞
is a play and n ≥ 0 we denote by hn ∈ Λ
n × S the prefix of h of length n. The
space H∞ together with the σ-algebra generated by all finite cylinders is a measure
space. We denote by H(n) the algebra generated by the finite histories of length
n. We assume perfect recall. Accordingly, a (behavior) strategy of player i is a
function σi : H → ∆(Ai) such that σi(hn) ∈ ∆(A
i(sn)) for every finite history
hn = (s0, a0, · · · , sn) ∈ H . Denote by Σ
i the set of all strategies of player i, by
Σ := ×i∈IΣ
i the set of all strategy profiles, and by Σ−i := ×j 6=iΣ
j the set of all
strategy profiles of all players except player i.
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A class of simple strategies is the class of stationary strategies. Those are strate-
gies in which the choice of a player at each stage depends only on the current state,
and not on previously visited states or on past choices of the players. A stationary
strategy of player i can be identified with an element of Σistat := ×s∈S∆(A
i(s)) ⊂
R
∑
s∈S |A
i(s)|, and will be denoted xi = (xi(s))s∈S. A strategy profile σ = (σ
i)i∈I
is stationary if for every player i ∈ I the strategy σi is stationary. Denote by
Σstat = ×i∈IΣ
i
stat the set of stationary strategy profiles.
In Section 4.1 we will make use of the concept of general strategy (see Mertens,
Sorin, and Zamir, 2015), which is a probability distribution over behavior strate-
gies. By Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn, 1956) every general strategy is equivalent to a
behavior strategy.
Every initial state s0 ∈ S and every strategy profile σ = (σ
i)i∈I ∈ Σ induce a
probability distribution Ps0,σ over the set of plays H
∞. Denote the corresponding
expectation operator by Es0,σ.
For every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0, and every strategy
profile σ, the λ-discounted payoff is
γiλ(s0; σ) := Es0,σ
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
λnui(sn, an)
]
. (1)
For every integer N ≥ 0, every initial state s0, and every strategy profile σ, the
N-stage payoff is
γiN(s0; σ) :=
1
N
Es0,σ
[
N−1∑
n=0
ui(sn, an)
]
.
3 The Modified Games: Definition and Sum-
mary of Results
The main subject of this paper is the modified game, which is an auxiliary normal-
form game that corresponds to a given stochastic game Γ = (S, I, (Ai(s))s∈S,i∈I, (u
i)i∈I , q).
In this normal-form game, the set of players is I and the set of strategies of each
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player i ∈ I is Σi, as in the stochastic game. The payoff function of the modi-
fied game depends on four elements: (a) an initial state s0 ∈ S, (b) a discount
factor λ ∈ [0, 1), (c) a collection ~D = (Di)i∈I of partitions of the set of states,
one partition for each player, and (d) a collection of vectors ~c = (ci)i∈I , where
ci = (ci(D))D∈Di ∈ R
Di for each player i ∈ I. In the next subsection we define the
payoff function of the modified game.
3.1 Definition of the modified game
Definition 3.1 For every strategy profile σ, every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every
initial state s0 ∈ S, every state s ∈ S, and every action profile a ∈ A(s), the
expected λ-discounted time the play spends in state s and the players play the
action profile a is
tλ(s0, σ; s, a) := Es0,σ
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
λn1{sn=s,an=a}
]
.
We denote by tλ(s0, σ) := (tλ(s0, σ; s, a))s∈S,a∈A(s) the state-action discounted time
vector.
Fix an initial state s0 ∈ S, a discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), and a strategy profile
σ ∈ Σ. For every set of states D ⊆ S, the λ-discounted time that the play spends
in D is
tλ(s0, σ;D) := Es0,σ
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
λn1{sn∈D}
]
=
∑
s∈D,a∈A(s)
tλ(s0, σ; s, a).
Let i ∈ I be a player. The λ-discounted (unnormalized) payoff that player i
receives while the play is in D is
U iλ(s0, σ;D) := Es0,σ
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
λnui(sn, an)1{sn∈D}
]
=
∑
s∈D,a∈A(s)
tλ(s0, σ; s, a)u
i(s, a). (2)
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The quantity
U i
λ
(s0,σ;D)
tλ(s0,σ;D)
is the normalized λ-discounted payoff of player i during
visits to D.
Given a partition Di of the set of states and a vector ci = (ci(D))D∈Di ∈ R
Di
define a new payoff function γ̂iλ(s0, ·;D
i, ci) : Σ→ R over the set of strategy profiles
by
γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci) :=
∑
D∈Di
min
{
U iλ(s0, σ;D), tλ(s0, σ;D) · c
i(D)
}
(3)
=
∑
D∈Di
tλ(s0, σ;D)min
{
U i
λ
(s0,σ;D)
tλ(s0,σ;D)
, ci(D)
}
, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
where by convention 0
0
= 1. Thus, to calculate the payoff γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci), we take
the normalized λ-discounted payoff during the visits to each element D of Di, and,
if this quantity is higher than ci(D), we lower it to ci(D). We then sum up the
quantities that we obtained for all elements of D, after multiplying each one by
the λ-discounted time the play spends in D. Accordingly, with the new payoff
function ci(D) is the maximal amount that player i can receive during the visits
to D.
For every partition Di of the set of states we have
γiλ(s0, σ) =
∑
D∈Di
U iλ(s0, σ;D
i), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1), ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (4)
Consequently, by Eq. (3)
γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci) ≤ γiλ(s0, σ), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1), ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (5)
Since payoffs are bounded by 1, if ci(D) ≥ 1 for every element D ∈ Di, then there
is an equality in Eq. (5).
Definition 3.2 Let λ ∈ [0, 1) be a discount factor, let s0 ∈ S be a state, let
~D = (Di)i∈I be a collection of partitions of the set of states, and let ~c = (c
i)i∈I ∈
×i∈IR
Di. The modified games Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) is the normal-form game (I,Σ, (γ̂
i
λ(s0, ·;D
i, ci))i∈I).
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Remark 3.3 (Alternative definitions of the modified game) The minimum
in Eq. (3) that defines the payoff in the modified game is between the discounted
payoff during the visits to an element D of Di and the normalized cut-off. Several
alternative definitions come to mind:
1. The minimum could have been taken in each stage separately, instead of di-
viding the stages according to the element of Di that contains the current
state.
2. The minimum could have been taken for each play path separately.
3. The minimum could have been taken for each visit to an element of Di sep-
arately, instead of aggregating all visits to the same element.
Each alternative definition will satisfy some of the results that we prove in the
sequel, but not all of them.
Remark 3.4 (The modified game in absorbing games) When specialized to
absorbing games and the partition Di that contains only singletons, for every player
i ∈ I, the modified game defined by Solan (1999) coincides with alternative 1
in Remark 3.3. Another variant of the modified game for absorbing games was
presented in Solan and Vohra (2002). Unlike Solan (1999) and Solan and Vohra
(2002), where the modified game was an absorbing game, just like the original
game, here the modified game is a normal-form game.
Remark 3.5 (On the discount factor) Definition 3.2 assumes that all players
share the same discount factor. Our results continue to hold if each player has a
different discount factor.
Remark 3.6 (The modified game of zero-sum games) It is worth noting that
when the original stochastic game is a two-player zero-sum game, the modified game
is no longer a zero-sum game.
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3.2 Summary of Results
Since the paper is long and presents many results, some on the modified game
and some that are used in the proofs of the main results, we end this section by
providing a list of the main results concerning the modified game.
• The modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) admits an equilibrium. Moreover, there is an
equilibrium in which all players use stationary strategies (Theorem 4.1).
• The function that assigns to each discount factor λ the set of equilibria
in stationary strategies of the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) is semi-algebraic
(Theorem 4.11).
• Denote by viλ(s) the λ-discounted max-min value of player i in the stochastic
game when the initial state is s. If the partitionDi satisfies a certain property
(see Definition 6.2), and if ci(D) ≥ limλ→1 v
i
λ(s) for every element D ∈ D
i
and every state s ∈ D, then the limit of the max-min value of the modified
game as the discount factor goes to 1 exists and is equal to limλ→1 v
i
λ(s0)
(Theorem 6.8).
• Denote by viλ(s) the λ-discounted min-max value of player i in the stochastic
game when the initial state is s. If the partitionDi satisfies a certain property
(see Definition 7.2), and if ci(D) ≥ limλ→1 v
i
λ(s) for every element D ∈ D
i
and every state s ∈ D, then the limit of the min-max value of the modified
game as the discount factor goes to 1 exists and is equal to limλ→1 v
i
λ(s0)
(Theorem 7.3).
• The min-max value in stationary strategies of the modified game is at least
the min-max value of the modified game and at most the discounted min-max
value in the original game (Theorem 8.1).
• The max-min value in stationary strategies of the modified game is at most
the max-min value of the modified game (Theorem 9.3), and the difference
may not vanish as the discount factor goes to 1 (Example 9.4).
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4 The Modified Stochastic Game: Equilibrium
Using standard arguments one can show that the modified game admits an equi-
librium. Indeed, the space of pure strategies is compact in the product topology,
hence the space of mixed strategies is compact in the weak-* topology. Moreover,
the modified payoff function, defined on the space of profiles of mixed strategies,
is continuous in the weak-* topology and concave in each of its coordinates. By,
e.g., Schauder’s fixed point theorem, an equilibrium exists.
The payoff function in the modified game is neither multilinear nor quasiconcave
when restricted to stationary strategies, hence it is not clear that the game admits
an equilibrium in stationary strategies. Nevertheless we will prove in this section
that the modified game admits an equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Theorem 4.1 For every initial state s0 ∈ S, every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1),
every collection ~D = (Di)i∈I of partitions of the set of states, and every vector of
cutoffs ~c = (ci)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IR
Di, the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) admits an equilibrium
in stationary strategies.
When particularized to absorbing games, Theorem 4.1 coincides with Step 1 in
the proof of Theorem 4.5 in Solan (1999). In Section 4.1 we present some technical
tools that are needed to prove Theorem 4.1. The proof of the theorem together
with additional results appear in Section 4.2.
4.1 A Result on Stationary Strategies in MDP’s
Below we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the modified game by using a
fixed point theorem. To this end we will consider the best response of one player
to fixed strategies of the other players. When fixing the stationary strategies of
all players but one, the game is reduced to a Markov decision problem. The best-
response set-valued function in the modified game does not have convex values,
hence we will need a new tool to prove the existence of a fixed point, which we
describe in this section.
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A Markov decision process (MDP) is a stochastic game with a single player.
For notational convenience we denote the unique player by i.
We say that the two strategies σi and σ′i are λ-equivalent at the initial state
s0 if the two strategies induce the same state-action discounted time vector, that
is, tλ(s0, σ
i) = tλ(s0, σ
′i). As the following result states, for every strategy there
exists a λ-discounted equivalent stationary strategy at any given initial state.
Theorem 4.2 (Altman, 1999, Corollary 10.1) For every discount factor λ ∈
[0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, and every strategy σ
i ∈ Σi there exists a stationary
strategy xi ∈ Σistat that is λ-equivalent to σ
i at s0.
The following result states that the stationary strategy xi that is λ-equivalent
to σi at s0 is unique, up to its definition in states that are never visited.
Lemma 4.3 Let λ ∈ [0, 1) be a discount factor, let s0 ∈ S be a state, let x
i and
x′i be two stationary strategies in Σistat that are λ-discounted equivalent at s0, let
s ∈ S, and let a ∈ Ai(s). If tλ(s0, x
i; {s}) > 0 then xi(s; a) = x′i(s; a).
Proof. The stationarity of xi implies that
xi(s; a) =
tλ(s0, x
i; s, a)∑
a′∈Ai(s) tλ(s0, x
i; s, a′)
=
tλ(s0, x
i; s, a)
tλ(s0, xi; {s})
,
whenever the denominator is positive, and a similar equality holds for x′i. Since
xi and x′i are λ-equivalent at s0, either both denominators (for x
i and for x′i) are
positive, or both are equal to 0. The result follows.
We will need below the following observation that strengthens Theorem 4.2
and that is stated without a proof. It says that if xi is a stationary strategy that
is λ-discounted equivalent to σi, then the probability that xi plays the action a at
state s cannot exceed the maximal probability that σi plays a in some visit to s,
and cannot fall below the minimal probability that σi plays a in some visit to s.
To formally state the result, for every state s ∈ S we denote by Hs the set of
all finite histories that end at s:
Hs := {(s0, a0, · · · , sn) ∈ H : sn = s}.
12
Lemma 4.4 Let λ ∈ [0, 1) be a discount factor, let s0 ∈ S be a state, and let
σi ∈ Σi be a strategy. Let xi ∈ Σistat be a stationary strategy that is λ-equivalent
to σi at s0. Then
inf
h∈Hs
σi(h; a) ≤ xi(s; a) ≤ sup
h∈Hs
σi(h; a).
It is well known that the set of stationary optimal strategies in an MDP is
convex. The following lemma implies in particular a weaker version of this result,
namely that the set of optimal stationary strategies is monovex. Below we will use
the lemma for a modified game, in which the set of stationary optimal strategies
is not convex.
Lemma 4.5 Let s0 ∈ S be a state and let x
i and x′i be two stationary strategies
in Σistat. Let σ
i
α := [α(x
i), (1 − α)(x′i)] be the general strategy that follows xi
with probability α and x′i with probability 1 − α. For every α ∈ [0, 1] let xiα be a
stationary strategy that is λ-equivalent to the strategy σiα at the initial state s0 (see
Proposition 4.2), so that
tλ(s0, x
i
α) = αtλ(s0, x
i) + (1− α)tλ(s0, x
′i).
Then the function α 7→ xiα(s; a) is monotone for every state s ∈ S for which∑
a′∈Ai(s) tλ(s0, x
i; s, a′) +
∑
a′∈Ai(s) tλ(s0, x
′i; s, a′) > 0 and for every action a ∈
Ai(s).
Proof. Note that if α = βα′ + (1 − β)α′′ then xiα is λ-equivalent at s0 to
the general strategy [β(xiα′), (1 − β)(x
i
α′′)]. Together with Lemma 4.4 this im-
plies that the function α 7→ xiα(s; a) is monotone for every state s ∈ S for which
tλ(s0, x
i; {s}) + tλ(s0, x
′i; {s}) > 0 and for every action a ∈ Ai(s). The continuity
of this function follows from Lemma 4.3 and from the continuity of the function
xi 7→ tλ(s0, x
i).
As a corollary we deduce the following.
Corollary 4.6 Let g : Σi → R be a real-valued function that satisfies the following
conditions:
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1. The function g depends on its parameter only through its state-action dis-
counted time vector: there are s0 ∈ S, λ ∈ (0, 1), and a continuous function
f : ∆(S × A)→ R such that g(s0, σ
i) = f(tλ(s0, σ
i)) for every σi ∈ Σi.
2. The function g is quasiconcave: For every σi, σ′i ∈ Σi and every β ∈ [0, 1]
we have
g([β(σi), (1− β)(σ′i)]) ≥ βg(σi) + (1− β)g(σ′i).
Then the set argmaxσi∈Σig(σ
i) of maximizers of g is a closed monovex set.
Proof. The set argmaxσi∈Σig(σ
i) is closed since the function f is continuous.
The set is monovex by Lemma 4.5.
4.2 Stationary Equilibria in the Modified Game
Because for every set of states D ⊆ S the functions tλ(s0, ·;D) and U
i
λ(s0, ·;D)
are continuous over Σ and because the minimum of two continuous function is a
continuous function, it follows that the payoff functions in the modified game is
continuous over the space of strategy profiles Σ. This observation is summarized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7 For every λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I,
every partition Di of the set of states, and every vector ci ∈ RD
i
, the function
σ 7→ γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci) is continuous.
We will now show that in the modified game, when the other players play a
stationary strategy, player i has a stationary best response.
Lemma 4.8 For every λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I,
every partition Di of the set of states, every vector ci ∈ RD
i
, and every stationary
strategy profile x−i ∈ Σ−istat of the other players, there is a stationary strategy
xi ∈ Σistat that maximizes player i’s payoff in the modified game:
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci) = max
σi∈Σi
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci). (6)
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Proof. Fixing a stationary strategy profile x−i of the other players, the decision
problem of player i in the modified game becomes a Markov decision problem,
albeit with the modified payoff function.
The set of all strategies of player i is compact and the payoff function σi 7→
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci) is continuous (Lemma 4.7), hence the maximum on the right-
hand side of Eq. (6) is attained by some strategy σi ∈ Σi. By Proposition 4.2, at the
initial state s0 the strategy σ
i induces the same state-action discounted time vector
as some stationary strategy xi ∈ Σistat. By Eq. (2) the payoff γ̂
i
λ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci)
depends on σi only through the state-action λ-discounted time vector, and there-
fore γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci) = γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci), and the claim follows.
In the proof of Theorem 4.1 we will use sets in a Euclidean space that satisfy
a condition that resembles convexity; specifically, sets that satisfy the following
condition: for every two points in the set there is a continuous path in the set that
connects the two points and that is monotone in each coordinate. Such sets, which
were introduced in Buhuvsky, Solan, and Solan (2016), are called monovex.
Definition 4.9 A set X ⊆ Rd is monovex if for every x, y ∈ X there is a contin-
uous path f : [0, 1]→ X that satisfies the following properties:
1. f(0) = x and f(1) = y.
2. fi(t) : [0, 1] → R is a monotone function (nondecreasing or nonincreasing)
for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
The main property of monovex sets that we will need is that every closed
monovex set is contractible (see Buhuvsky, Solan, and Solan, 2016). We are now
ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Define a set-valued function F : X → X as follows.
For every player i ∈ I and every stationary strategy profile x ∈ X ,
F i(x) :=
{
yi ∈ Σistat : γ̂
i
λ(s0, y
i, x−i;Di, ci) = max
σi∈Σi
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci)
}
.
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By Lemma 4.8 the set F i(x) is nonempty for every player i ∈ I and every stationary
strategy profile x ∈ Σstat. By Corollary 4.6 this set is monovex, and therefore by
Buhovsky, Solan, and Solan (2016) it is contractible. Lemma 4.7 implies that the
graph of F is closed. By the Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) fixed point theorem
the set-valued function F has a fixed point, which is a stationary equilibrium in
the modified game.
As the following example shows, the equilibrium in stationary strategies that
is guaranteed to exist by Theorem 4.1 may depend on the initial state s0, even if
the set of players includes a single player.
Example 4.10 Consider the following stochastic game with four states, which
depends on two parameters, y ∈ R and p ∈ [0, 1], and is graphically given in
Figure 1; in this figure, the payoff appears on the left-hand side of each entry,
while the transition appears on the right-hand side.
• There is a single player: I = {i}.
• There are four states S = {s0, s1, s2, s3}. States s2 and s3 are absorbing and
yield payoffs 2 and 3, respectively.
• In state s0 the player has a single action. His payoff is y and the play moves
to state s1.
• In state s1 the player has two actions, T and B. The payoff in this state and
the transition are given in Figure 1.
y s1
s0
B
T
s1
0 [(1−p)(s
1),p(s2)]
−1 [(1−p)(s
1),p(s3)] 2 s
2
s2
3 s
3
s3
Figure 1: The game in Example 4.10.
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Let Di =
{
{s0, s1}, {s2}, {s3}
}
, and ci = (ci(D))D∈Di be the vector
ci({s0, s1}) = 0, ci({s2}) = 2, ci({s3}) = 3.
Thus, the payoff may be lowered only in the set {s0, s1}. We will show that for a
proper choice of the parameters λ, p, and y, the optimal strategy in the modified
game Γ̂λ(s0;D
i, ci) depends on the initial state: when the initial state is s1 the
optimal strategy consists of playing T in state s1, while when the initial state is s0
the optimal strategy consists of playing B in state s1.
The intuition for this result is as follows: When the initial state is s1 the payoff
while the play is in {s0, s1} is nonpositive, hence the minimum with ci({s0, s1})
has no effect on the payoff in the modified game, and the modified game is reduced
to a standard Markov decision problem. The parameters p and λ will be chosen
so that the optimal strategy is to play T in this case. Suppose now that the initial
state is s0. Since y is positive, the player is better off choosing B at state s1 as
long as his total discounted payoff before absorption is nonnegative. This increases
the probability to be absorbed in the better absorbing state s3, while not affecting
the modified payoff that he receives for the stages in which the play visits the set
{s0, s1}.
We turn to the formal calculations. As mentioned before, when the initial state
is s1 the modified game is a standard Markov decision problem, hence there is an
optimal strategy which is pure and stationary. Since at state s1 the play is absorbed
at every stage with probability p, the total discounted weight of the absorbing state
on the payoff is
λp+ (1− p)λ2p+ (1− p)2λ3p+ · · · =
λp
1− λ(1− p)
.
It follows that when the initial state is s1, the stationary strategy T is the unique
optimal strategy as soon as
2
λp
1− λ(1− p)
> −1
(
1−
λp
1− λ(1− p)
)
+ 3
λp
1− λ(1− p)
,
which solves to
1 > λ(1 + p).
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Suppose now that the initial state is s0. We choose y so that under the station-
ary strategy that plays B in s0, the discounted payoff when the play is in {s0, s1}
is 0. That is,
(1− λ)y − λ
(
1−
λp
1− λ(1− p)
)
= 0,
which solves to
y =
λ
1− λ(1− p)
. (7)
This implies that when y, λ, and p satisfy Eq. (7), under every strategy, the mod-
ified payoff in the set {s0, s1} is 0, hence the optimal strategy is the one that max-
imizes the expected absorbing payoff, which is the stationary strategy that plays B
at state s1.
We end this section by extending the semi-algebraic property of the set of dis-
counted equilibria of stochastic games to the modified game. Denote by Eλ(s0; ~D,~c)
the set of all stationary equilibria of the game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c). Because for every ini-
tial state s0 ∈ S, every set of states D ⊆ S, and every player i ∈ I the functions
(λ, x) 7→ tλ(s0, x;D) and (λ, x) 7→ U
i
λ(s0, x;D) are semi-algebraic, where x ranges
over all stationary strategy profiles, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.11 For every initial state s0 ∈ S, every collection ~D = (D
i)i∈I of
partitions of the set of states, and every collection of cutoffs ~c = (ci)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IR
Di
the set-valued function λ 7→ Eλ(s0; ~D,~c) is semi-algebraic.
5 The Max-Min Value in Stochastic Games
Our next goal is to study the max-min value in the modified game. To this end we
recall the concept of max-min value in the original stochastic game and a result of
Neyman (2003) on the uniform max-min value in stochastic game.
The λ-discounted max-min value of player i at the initial state s0 in the original
game is given by
viλ(s0) := max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
γiλ(s0; σ
i, σ−i). (8)
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This is the maximal amount that player i can guarantee if the other players get to
know his strategy and try to minimize his payoff. Because the λ-discounted payoff
(see Eq. (1)) is a continuous function of the strategies of the players, the maximum
and minima in Eq. (8) are attained. It is well known that the maximum and minima
in Eq. (8) are attained by stationary strategies. Moreover, the function λ 7→
viλ(s0) is semi-algebraic (see Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) and Neyman (2003)),
and therefore the limit
vi1(s0) := lim
λ→1
viλ(s0)
exists for every player i ∈ I and every initial state s0 ∈ S. The quantity v
i
1(s0) is
called the uniform max-min value of player i at the initial state s0.
For every two bounded stopping times τ < τ ′, the expected average payoff
between stages τ and τ ′ is
γi(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) :=
Es0,σ[
∑τ ′
n=τ r(sn, an) | H(τ)]
Es0,σ[τ − τ
′ | H(τ)]
.
Note that γi(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) is a random variable that is measurable according to the
information at stage τ .
Definition 5.1 Let ε > 0 and let i ∈ I be a player. A strategy σi is a uniform
ε-max-min strategy of player i if there exist λ0 ∈ [0, 1) and N0 ∈ N such that the
following holds for every initial state s0 ∈ S, every strategy profile σ
−i ∈ Σ−i of the
other players, every discount factor λ ∈ (λ0, 1), and every bounded stopping time
τ that satisfies Es0,σi,σ−i [τ ] ≥ N0:
γiλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i) ≥ vi1(s0)− ε, (9)
γi(s0, σ
i, σ−i; 0, τ) ≥ vi1(s0)− ε. (10)
Remark 5.2 (On the definition of uniform ε-max-min strategies) The stan-
dard definition of uniform ε-max-min strategies requires Eq. (10) only for constant
stopping times τ . We will need in the sequel the stronger version that we presented
here. Sometimes a uniform ε-max-min strategy is required to satisfy that the ex-
pected long-run average payoff is at least vi1(s0)− ε for every strategy profile of the
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other players (see Mertens and Neyman (1981) and Neyman (2003)). Our results
are not affected by adding this requirement.
For every player i ∈ I, every strategy σi ∈ Σi, and every finite history hn ∈ H ,
denote by σihn the strategy profile σ conditioned on the history hn, that is,
σihn(ĥm) := σ
i(s0, a0, · · · , sn−1, an−1, ŝ0, â0, ŝ1, â1, · · · , ŝm), ∀ĥm = (ŝ0, â0, · · · , ŝm) ∈ H.
Definition 5.3 Let ε > 0 and let i ∈ I be a player. A strategy σi of player i is
ε-max-min preserving if for every strategy profile σ−i ∈ Σ−i, every play h ∈ H∞,
and every two bounded stopping times τ < τ ′ we have
Esτ ,σihτ ,σ
−i
hτ
[vi1(sτ ′)] ≥ v
i
1(sτ )− ε. (11)
A uniform ε-max-min strategy need not be ε-max-min preserving, and an ε-
max-min preserving strategy need not be a uniform ε-max-min strategy.
Neyman (2003) adapted the construction of Mertens and Neyman (1981) and
constructed for every ε > 0 a uniform ε-max-min strategy that is also ε-max-min
preserving.
Theorem 5.4 (Neyman, 2003) For every ε > 0 and every player i ∈ I, there
is a uniform ε-max-min strategy σi that is also ε-max-min preserving.
5.1 Markovian ε-Max-Min Strategies
A strategy of a player is Markovian w.r.t. a partition if the mixed action played at
each stage depends only on the play during the current visit to the element of the
partition that contains the current state. Formally,
Definition 5.5 Let i ∈ I be a player and let D be a partition of the set of states.
A strategy σi ∈ Σi is D-Markovian if σihn = σ
i
h˜n˜
for every two finite histories
hn = (s0, a0, · · · , sn) and h˜n˜ = (s˜0, a˜0, · · · , s˜n˜) that satisfy
• The two histories end at the same state: sn = s˜n˜.
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• In stage n (resp. in stage n˜) the finite history hn (resp. h˜n˜) enters a new
element of D, that is, D(sn−1) 6= D(sn) and D(s˜n˜−1) 6= D(s˜n˜), where D(s)
is the element of the partition D that contains s, for every state s ∈ S,
One naive way to define a D-Markovian strategy from a strategy σi is the
following: whenever the play enters an element of D, player i forgets past play and
restarts playing σi. We will denote this strategy σiD and define it now formally.
Given a partition D of the set of states, let (τDk )k≥0 be the sequence of stopping
times that indicates when the play moves from one element of the partition D to
another element of the partition:
τD0 := 0,
τDk := min
{
n > τDk−1 : D(sn) 6= D(sn−1)
}
, k ∈ N,
where the minimum of an empty set is +∞. The stages between stage τDk and
τDk+1 − 1 are called the a D-run. For every n ≥ 0 let k(D;n) be the number of the
D-run that contains stage n; that is, it is the unique nonnegative integer k that
satisfies τDk ≤ n < τ
D
k+1.
Denote by ϕ(hn) the play along hn since the last switch of an element in D:
ϕ(hn) := (sτD
k(D,n)
(hn), aτDk(D,n)(hn)
, sτD
k(D,n)
(hn)+1, aτDk(D,n)(hn)+1
, · · · , sn).
The strategy σiD that is defined by
σiD(hn) := σ
i(ϕ(hn)), ∀hn ∈ H,
is D-Markovian.
For every play h ∈ H∞ and every partition D of the set of states, denote by
Z(h;D) ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,∞} the number of times in which the play switches between
elements of D along h:
Z(h;D) := sup{k ≥ 0: τDk < +∞}.
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5.2 The Partition According to the UniformMax-Min Value
of Player i
It will be useful to single out the partition Di∗ of the set of states S according to
the uniform max-min value of player i: two states s, s′ ∈ S are in the same element
of the partition Di∗ if and only if v
i
1(s) = v
i
1(s
′). The following result implies that
when player i plays an ε-max-min preserving strategy, the expected number of
times that the play moves between elements of Di∗ is bounded by a constant that
is independent of ε and the strategy profile of the other players. Before stating
the result we provide a weaker version of the concept of an ε-max-min preserving
strategy.
Definition 5.6 Let i ∈ I be a player, let ε > 0, and let D be a partition of the set
of states. A strategy σi ∈ Σi is (D, ε)-max-min preserving if for every initial state
s0 ∈ S, every strategy profile of the other players σ
−i ∈ Σ−i, every play h ∈ H∞,
every k ≥ 0, and every bounded stopping time τDk < τ
′ ≤ τDk+1 we have
Es
τ
Di∗
k
,σi
h
τ
Di∗
k
,σ−i
h
τ
Di∗
k
[vi1(sτ ′)] ≥ v
i
1(sτD
i
∗
k
)− ε.
Note that every ε-max-min preserving strategy is in particular (D, ε)-max-min
preserving, for every partition D of the set of states. Moreover, if the strategy σi is
ε-max-min preserving, then for every partition D the strategy σiD is (D, ε)-max-min
preserving.
Denote the minimal distance between distinct uniform max-min values of some
player by
ρ := min{|vi1(s)− v
i
1(s
′)| : s, s′ ∈ S, i ∈ I, vi1(s) 6= v
i
1(s
′)}.
Theorem 5.7 For every δ > 0 there is ε0 > 0 such that for every ε < ε0, every
player i ∈ I, every (Di∗, ε)-max-min preserving strategy σ
i ∈ Σi, and every strategy
profile σ−i ∈ Σ−i there is an event E for which Ps0,σi,σ−i(E) > 1− δ and
Es0,σi,σ−i [Z(·;D
i
∗) · 1E ] ≤ C(ρ), (12)
where C(ρ) is some constant that is independent of δ.
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Proof. We first recall a general result on submartingales. Let η > 0 and let
(Wn)n≥0 be a submartingale that satisfies the following properties for every n ≥ 0:
• The random variable Wn attains values in the interval [−1, 2].
• Either Wn+1 = Wn or |Wn+1 −Wn| ≥ η.
Denote by Z∗ the number of times in which the process (Wn) changes its value:
Z∗ := #{n ≥ 0: Wn 6=Wn+1}. (13)
Then there is a constant C(η) such that E[Z∗] ≤ C(η). Moreover, the function η 7→
C(η) can be taken to be monotonic nonincreasing. This result can be deduced by
the bound on the expected number of downcrossings of a bounded submartingale,
see, e.g., Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 35.4.
Let now δ > 0 and fix two real numbers K ≥
C(
ρ
2
)
δ
and ε0 <
ρ
2K
. Define a
stochastic process (Wn)
∞
n=0 by
Wn :=
{
vi1(sn) + ε0k(D
i
∗;n), Wn−1 < 1 +
ρ
2
,
Wn−1 Wn−1 ≥ 1 +
ρ
2
.
Note that Wn < 1 + ρ for every n ≥ 0. Ignoring the upper bound of 1 +
ρ
2
that
we impose on the process (Wn)n∈N, this process is equal to the uniform max-min
value of the current state, plus ε multiplied by the number of times in which the
uniform max-min value changed along the play.
Let ε < ε0, let σ
i be a (Di∗, ε)-max-min preserving strategy of player i, and
let σ−i be any strategy profile of the other players. Since σi is a (Di∗, ε)-max-
min preserving strategy, the process (Wn)
∞
n=0 is a submartingale under Ps0,σi,σ−i .
Whenever the uniform max-min value of player i changes, the value of Wn changes
by at least ρ − ε0. By Eq. (13), Es0,σi,σ−i [Z
∗] ≤ C(ρ − ε0) ≤ C(
ρ
2
). By Markov’s
Inequality, Ps0,σi,σ−i(Z
∗ < K) ≥ 1−
C(
ρ
2
)
K
≥ 1−δ. Define the event E := {Z∗ < K}.
On this event we have Wn ≤ 1+Kε < 1+
ρ
2
for every n ≥ 0, and therefore on this
event Z(·;Di∗) = Z
∗. Moreover, Ps0,σi,σ−i(E) ≥ 1− δ, and
Es0,σi,σ−i [Z(·;D
i
∗) · 1E ] ≤ Es0,σi,σ−i [Z
∗] ≤ C(ρ
2
),
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and the result follows.
As a conclusion of Theorem 5.7 we deduce that in the notations of the statement
of the theorem, if the strategy σi is in addition Di∗-Markovian, then the expected
number of times the uniform max-min value of player i changes along the play is
bounded.
Corollary 5.8 In the notations of Theorem 5.7, if the strategy σi is in addition
Di∗-Markovian then Es0,σi,σ−i [Z(·;D
i
∗)] ≤
4C(ρ)
1−δ
.
Proof. By Eq. (12) and Markov’s inequality, Ps0,σi,σ−i(Z(·;D
i
∗·1E) ≤ 2C(ρ)) ≥
1
2
(1− δ). Denoting x := Es0,σi,σ−i[Z(·;D
i
∗)] we deduce that x ≤ 2C(ρ) +
1
2
(1+ δ)x,
and the claim follows.
The following result2 implies in particular that every player i has aDi∗-Markovian
uniform ε-max-min strategy, for every ε > 0.
Theorem 5.9 For every δ > 0 there is ε0 > 0 such that for every ε < ε0 and every
uniform ε-max-min strategy σi that is ε-max-min preserving, the strategy σiDi∗ is
uniform δ-max-min and (Di∗, ε)-max-min preserving.
Proof. Fix δ > 0 and a player i ∈ I. Let ε be smaller than the quantity ε0
given in Theorem 5.7 and smaller than δρ
2C(ρ)
, where C(ρ) is the constant given in
Theorem 5.7. Let σi be a uniform ε-max-min strategy that is ε-max-min preserving
and fix a strategy profile of the other players σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
By construction, the strategy σiDi∗ is (D
i
∗, ε)-max-min preserving. It remains to
show that the strategy σiDi∗ is a uniform δ-max-min strategy.
For every two stopping times τ and τ ′ denote their minimum by
τ ∧ τ ′ := min{τ, τ ′}.
2Abraham Neyman advised the author that Jean-Franc¸ois Mertens and himself were aware of
this result.
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Since the strategy σiDi∗ is (D
i
∗, ε)-max-min preserving, for every k ≥ 0 we have
v(s
τ
Di∗
k
∧τ
) ≤ Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [v(s
τ
Di∗
k+1∧τ
)]− ε on the event {τ
Di∗
k ∧ τ < τ
Di∗
k+1 ∧ τ}. (14)
Using iteratively Eq. (14) over all k ≥ 0 we deduce that for every bounded stopping
time τ
vi1(s0) ≤ Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [v
i
1(sτ )]− ε
(
1 +
∑
k≥0
Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i(τ
Di∗
k ∧ τ < τ
Di∗
k+1 ∧ τ)
)
≤ Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [v
i
1(sτ )]− εC2(ρ),
where C2(ρ) =
4C(ρ)
1−δ
and the last inequality follows from Corollary 5.8. By averag-
ing this inequality over all constant stopping times τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} we conclude
that for every N ≥ 0,
vi1(s0) ≤
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
vi1(sn)− εC2(ρ). (15)
By Theorem 5.7 there is an event E for which Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i(E) > 1− δ and
Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [Z(·;D
i
∗) · 1E ] ≤ C(ρ). (16)
By Eq. (16) and Markov’s inequality we deduce that
Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i
(
Z(·;Di∗) <
ρ
2ε
| E
)
≥ 1− 2ε
ρ
Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [Z(·;D
i
∗) | E] (17)
≥ 1−
2ε
ρ
C(ρ) ≥ 1− δ, ∀σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
Denote by F the event
F := E ∩
{
Z(·;Di∗) <
ρ
2ε
}
.
Since Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i(E) > 1 − δ and by Eq. (17), Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i(F ) ≥ 1 − 2δ. Since the
strategy σiDi∗ is D
i
∗-Markovian and since the strategy σ
i is ε-max-min preserving,
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for every k ≥ 0 and every bounded stopping time τ ′ that satisfies τ
Di∗
k < τ
′ ≤ τ
Di∗
k+1
we have
γi(s0, σ
i
Di∗
, σ−i; τ
Di∗
k , τ
′) ≥ vi1(sτD
i
∗
k
)−ε on the event
{
Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [τ
′ − τ
Di∗
k | H(τ
Di∗
k )] ≥ N0
}
,
(18)
where N0 is the constant given in Theorem 5.4.
On the event F the strategy σi restarts at most ρ
2ε
times, and therefore on this
event the expected number of stages that take part in Di∗-runs shorter than N0
is at most ρN0
2ε
. Since Ps0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i(F ) > 1 − 2δ, since payoffs are bounded by 1,
and by Eqs. (15) and (18) we deduce that for every stopping time τ that satisfies
Es0,σi
Di∗
,σ−i [τ ] ≥
ρN0
2ε2
we have
γi(s0, σ
i
Di∗
, σ−i; 0, τ) ≥ vi1(s0)− 3ε− 4δ,
and therefore for every λ sufficiently close to 1,
γiλ(s0, σ
i
Di∗
, σ−i) ≥ vi1(s0)− 4ε− 4δ.
The desired result follows.
A useful property of uniform ε-max-min Di∗-Markovian strategies is that if the
expected length of the k’th run is high, then the average expected payoff during
the k’th run is high. This observation is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.10 Let i ∈ I be a player, let ε > 0, let σi ∈ Σi be a uniform ε-max-
min Di∗-Markovian strategy, and let N0 ∈ N be the constant given in Definition 5.1.
Then for every initial state s0, every strategy profile σ
−i ∈ Σ−i of the other players,
and every k ≥ 0, on the set {Es0,σi,σ−i [τ
Di∗
k+1 − τ
Di∗
k | H(τ
Di∗
k )] ≥ N0} we have
γ(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τ
Di∗
k , τ
Di∗
k+1) ≥ v
i
1(sτD
i
∗
k
)− ε.
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6 The Modified Stochastic Game: The Max-Min
Value
In this section we compare the limit as the discount factor goes to 1 of the max-min
value in the modified game to the uniform max-min value in the original stochastic
game.
The max-min value of player i in the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) is
v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci) := max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci).
Since the payoff function σ 7→ γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci) is continuous (Lemma 4.7), the max-
min value exists. By Eq. (5) we have γ̂iλ(s0, σ;D
i, ci) ≤ γiλ(s0, σ) for every strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ, and consequently
v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci) ≤ viλ(s0). (19)
We do not know whether the function λ 7→ v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci) is semi-algebraic, and
in particular we do not know whether the limit limλ→1 v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) always exists.
If the limit exists, we denote it by v̂i1(s0;D
i, ci) and term it the limit max-min value
of player i in the modified game.
As the following example shows, the inequality in Eq. (19) can be strict, even
if the cutoff vector ci is high, and the difference between viλ(s0) and v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci)
need not vanish as λ goes to 1.
Example 6.1 Consider the game that is depicted in Figure 2. In this game there
is a single player, two states S = {s0, s1}, and the player has a single action in
each state. Set D =
{
{s0}, {s1}
}
and c(D) = 4 for every D ∈ D.
0 s
1
s0
6 s
0
s1
Figure 2: The game in Example 6.1.
In this game the payoff alternates between 0 and 6, so that for each initial state
the λ-discounted value of this Markov chain converges to 3 as the discount factor λ
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goes to 1. In particular, the cutoff vector is higher than the λ-discounted value of
the game for every discount factor λ sufficiently close to 1. In the modified game
the payoff in state s1 is 4, so that the value of the modified game converges to 2 as
λ goes to 1.
We will now provide conditions that ensure that the limit max-min value of a
player in the modified game exists and coincides with his uniform max-min value
in the original game. To this end we present a property, called Property P, that
some partitions satisfy.
6.1 Property P
We turn to formally present Property P. Roughly, a partition Di satisfies Property
P w.r.t. player i if for every ε > 0 there is a uniform ε-max-min Di-Markovian
strategy of player i such that the number of times in which the play switches
between elements of Di is uniformly bounded, over the other players’ strategy
profile and over ε.
Definition 6.2 Let i ∈ I be a player. A partition D of the set of states S satisfies
Property P w.r.t. player i if there is a real number ζ > 0 and for every ε > 0 there
is a uniform ε-max-min D-Markovian strategy σi ∈ Σi such that for every strategy
profile σ−i ∈ Σ−i of the other players there is an event E for which Ps0,σi,σ−i(E) >
1− ε and
Es0,σi,σ−i[Z(·;D) · 1E ] ≤ ζ.
Example 6.3 (Absorbing Games) When the game is an absorbing game, the
state variable can change at most once, hence the element of the partition that
contains the current state changes at most once. It follows that any partition D
satisfies Property P w.r.t. all players, with ζ = 1.
Example 6.4 Similarly to Example 6.3, suppose that there is a set D ⊆ S such
that (a) all states that are not in D are absorbing, and (b) D = {D, {s}s 6∈D}.
Then the partition D satisfies Property P w.r.t. all players, with ζ = 1. In the
application in Section 10 we will use this partition.
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Example 6.5 (The partition Di∗) The partition D
i
∗ of the set of states accord-
ing to the uniform max-min value of player i satisfies Property P w.r.t. player i.
Indeed, by Theorems 5.4 and 5.9, for every ε > 0 player i has a Di∗-Markovian
uniform ε-max-min strategy σi, and therefore by Theorem 5.7 this strategy satisfies
Property P.
6.2 A Result in Probability
We would like to prove that when the partition Di satisfies Property P, and the
cutoffs (ci(D))D∈Di are sufficiently high, then the limit max-min value of a player
in the modified game exists and coincides with his uniform max-min value in the
original game. To this end we will show that a uniform ε-max-min Di-Markovian
strategy σi of player i guarantees to him in the modified game at least vi1(s0)−2ε.
By Lemma 5.10, and because the strategy σi is uniform ε-max-min Di-Markovian,
in every visit to an element of Di whose expected length is high, the expected
average payoff is at least vi1(s0)− ε. Property P assures that the expected number
of runs is bounded, hence the expected number of stages that belong to short visits
to elements of Di is uniformly bounded. In particular, most stages belong to long
visits to elements of Di. To show that the payoff in the modified game is high, we
need to show that for every element D of Di, the discounted payoff during long
visits to D is high. In this section we provide a result that will help us deduce
that when the expected average payoff during long visits to D is high, so is the
expected discounted payoff.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, let (Fn)n≥0 be a filtration, and let (τk)k≥0
be a sequence of stopping times adapted to the filtration (Fn)n≥0 such that τ0 = 0
and τk+1 > τk on the event {τk < ∞}, for every k ≥ 0. Denote k∗ := supk≥0{k ≥
0: τk <∞}.
For every nonnegative integer l denote by k(l) the unique nonnegative integer
that satisfies τk(l) ≤ l < τk(l)+1, and denote τ
l
k := τk ∧ l = min{τk, l}.
Theorem 6.6 In the notations above, If there is ζ > 0 such that E[k∗] ≤ ζ, then
for every ε > 0 and every N ≥ 0 there are M = M(ε,N, ζ) ≥ 0 and L0 =
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L0(ε,N, ζ) ≥ 0 (both are independent of the probability measure P ) that satisfy
L∑
l=0
P
(
{E[(τLk(l)+1 − τ
L
k(l)) ∧M | Fτk(l)] ≥ N}
)
≥ (1− ε)(L+ 1), ∀L ≥ L0.
For every k ≥ 0 call the sequence of stages between stages τk and τk+1 − 1 a
τ -run. The condition that E[k∗] is finite assures that on average there are few τ -
runs up to stage L, hence, when we restrict attention to stages {0, 1, 2, · · · , L}, the
expected length of τ -runs is large. Theorem 6.6 states a stronger property: there is
M such that the expected length of most τ -runs, restricted to their first M stages,
is high. Moreover, the constant M and the finite horizon L0 are independent of
the probability measure P . In our application, the probability measure P will be
determined by the strategies of the players. Since we study the max-min value,
we need the quantities M and L0 to be independent of the strategies of the other
player, hence M and L0 need to be independent of P .
The next example shows that the quantity M in Theorem 6.6 can be large
when ζ is large.
Example 6.7 Let p ∈ (0, 1), and consider a coin with parameter P (head) = p
that is drawn over and over. For every k ≥ 0 let τk be the following stopping time:
τk :=
{
k, if the first k draws are head,
∞, otherwise.
The first draw in which the outcome of the draw is tail is k∗ (recall that time starts
at 0), hence P (k∗ = k) = (1 − p)p
k, and in particular E[k∗] =
1
1−p
. Additionally,
on the event {τk <∞} we have E[(τk+1− τk)∧
N−p
1−p
| τk <∞] = N . It follows that
the constant M in Theorem 6.6 may be at least N−p
1−p
.
Proof of Theorem 6.6. We will substitute M = ⌈2ζN
ε
⌉ and L0 = ⌈
2ζM
ε
⌉,
where ⌈x⌉ is the least integer larger than or equal to the real number x. Denote
Gk := {τk <∞} ∩ {τk+1 − τk < M} .
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Then
ζ ≥ E[k∗] =
∞∑
k=0
P (τk <∞) ≥
∞∑
k=0
P (Gk). (20)
Since τLk+1 − τ
L
k ≤ τk+1 − τk, and since on Gk we have τk+1 − τk < M , it follows
that for every L ≥ 0,
E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Gk
]
< M
∞∑
k=0
P (Gk) ≤ ζM. (21)
Denote
Ek := {τk <∞} ∩ {E [(τk+1 − τk) ∧M | Fτk ] < N} .
By Markov’s Inequality, on Ek we have
P (τk+1 − τk < M | Fτk) = P ((τk+1 − τk) ∧M < M | Fτk) > 1−
N
M
≥ 1− ε
2ζ
.
This implies that
P (Ek ∩Gk) ≥ (1−
ε
2ζ
)P (Ek),
which subsequently implies that
P (Ek \Gk) ≤
ε
2ζ
P (Ek). (22)
As in Eq. (20) we have
∑∞
k=0 P (Ek) ≤ ζ , and therefore by Eq. (22)
∞∑
k=0
P (Ek \Gk) ≤
ε
2ζ
∞∑
k=0
P (Ek) ≤
ε
2
.
Since
∑∞
k=0(τ
L
k+1 − τ
L
k ) = L+ 1,
E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Ek\Gk
]
≤ ε
2
(L+ 1). (23)
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From Eqs. (21) and (23) we obtain that
L+ 1 = E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )
]
= E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1(Ek)c
]
+ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Ek∩Gk
]
+ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Ek\Gk
]
≤ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1(Ek)c
]
+ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Gk
]
+ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1Ek\Gk
]
≤ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1(Ek)c
]
+ ζM + ε
2
(L+ 1)
≤ E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1(Ek)c
]
+ ε(L+ 1).
The result follows since
E
[
∞∑
k=0
(τLk+1 − τ
L
k )1(Ek)c
]
=
L∑
l=0
P
(
{E[(τLk(l)+1 − τ
L
k(l)) ∧M | Fτk(l)] ≥ N}
)
.
6.3 Bounding the Max-Min Value in the Modified Game
Our goal in this section is to show that when the partition Di satisfies Property
P w.r.t. player i and the cutoff ci(D) is at least the uniform max-min value in all
states in D, for every element D ∈ Di, then the limit max-min value of player i in
the modified game exists and is equal to the uniform max-min value of the initial
state.
Theorem 6.8 Let Di be a partition of the set of states S that satisfies Property P
w.r.t. player i and let ci ∈ RD
i
satisfy ci(D) ≥ vi1(s) for every element D ∈ D
i and
every state s ∈ D. Then for every initial state s0 ∈ S the limit v̂
i
1(s0;D
i, ci) :=
limλ→1 v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) exists we have v̂i1(s0;D
i, ci) = vi1(s0).
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To prove Theorem 6.8 we will show that any uniform ε-max-min Di-Markovian
strategy σiD,ε guarantees approximately v
i
1(s0) in the modified game Γ̂λ(s0;D, c),
for every discount factor λ sufficiently close to 1.
For the proof of the theorem we will need two notations and an observation. For
every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every strategy profile σ, and every two bounded
stopping times 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ′ denote the expected unnormalized discounted time
between the stopping times τ and τ ′ by
tλ(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) := Es0,σ
[
τ ′−1∑
n=τ
λn−τ | H(τ)
]
.
Denote the expected normalized discounted payoff between the stopping times τ
and τ ′ by
γiλ(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) :=
Es0,σ
[∑τ ′−1
n=τ λ
n−τui(sn, an) | H(τ)
]
tλ(s0, σ; τ, τ ′)
. (24)
The quantities tλ(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) and γiλ(s0, σ; τ, τ
′) are random variables that depend
on the information at stage τ .
As is well known, the discounted payoff can be presented as a convex combi-
nation of the average payoffs. We will use the following relation, which relates the
partial discounted sum to arithmetic sums, and holds for every λ ∈ [0, 1), every
L ∈ N, every sequence of real numbers (xn)
L
n=0, and every M ≤ L:
L∑
n=0
λnxn =
M−1∑
n=0
(λn − λM)xn +
∞∑
l=M
(
((L ∧ l) + 1)(λl − λl+1)
∑L∧l
n=0 xn
(L ∧ l) + 1
)
. (25)
Moreover, when M is fixed, the ratio
∑M−1
n=0 (λ
n−λM )∑L
n=0 λ
n
of the sum of the coefficients
in the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) and the sum of the coefficients
on the left-hand side goes to 0 as λ goes to 1. When replacing the nonnegative
integer L by a stopping time τ , Eq. (25) translates to
E
[
τ∑
n=0
λnxn
]
= E
(τ∧M)−1∑
n=0
(λn − λτ∧M)xn
+ ∞∑
l=M
(λl − λl+1)E[((τ ∧ l) + 1)]
E[
∑τ∧l
n=0 xn]
E[(τ ∧ l) + 1]
.(26)
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Moreover, the ratio
E
[∑(τ∧M)−1
n=0 (λ
n−λτ∧M )
]
E[
∑τ
n=0 λ
n]
goes to 0 as λ goes to 1.
Proof. In view of Eq. (19) we need to show that v̂i1(s0;D
i, ci) ≥ vi1(s0). Fix
δ > 0. Let ζ be the constant of Definition 6.2, let ε > 0 be the constant given by
Theorem 5.9, let σi be the uniform ε-max-min Di-Markovian strategy for player i
given by Property P, and let σ−i be any strategy profile of the other players. We
will show that the strategy σi guarantees that player i’s payoff in the modified
game Γ̂λ(s0;D
i, ci) is at least vi1(s0) − 5ε − 2δ, provided the discount factor is
sufficiently close to 1.
Let N0 be the constant given by Theorem 5.4, and letM and L0 be the constant
given by Theorem 6.6 for ζ and N = N0. Let λ be sufficiently close to 1 such that
the ratio
E
[∑(τ∧M)−1
n=0 (λ
n−λτ∧M )
]
E[
∑τ
n=0 λ
n]
is smaller than ε.
We argue that on the event
{
Es0,σiD,ε,σ−i [τ
D
k+1 − τ
D
k | H(τ
D
k )] ≥ N0
}
we have
γiλ(s0, σ; τ
D
k , τ
D
k+1 − 1) ≥ v
i
1(sτDk )− 3ε. (27)
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Indeed, on this event
γiλ(s0, σ; τ
Di
k , τ
Di
k+1 − 1)
=
Es0,σ
[∑τDi
k+1−1
n=τD
i
k
λn−τ
Di
k ui(sn, an) | H(τ
Di
k )
]
tλ(s0, σ; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1)
(28)
=
E
[∑(τDi
k
∧M)−1
n=0 (λ
n − λτ∧M)ui(sn, an) | H(τ
Di
k )
]
tλ(s0, σ; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1)
(29)
+
∑∞
l=M(λ
l − λl+1)E[((τD
i
k ∧ l) + 1)]γ
i(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1)
tλ(s0, σ; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1)
≥
∞∑
l=M
(λl − λl+1)E[((τD
i
k ∧ l) + 1)]γ
i(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1)− ε (30)
≥ (vi1(s0)− ε)
∞∑
l=M
(λl − λl+1)E[((τD
i
k ∧ l) + 1)]− ε (31)
≥ (vi1(s0)− ε)(1− ε)− ε (32)
≥ vi1(s0)− 3ε, (33)
where Eq. (28) holds by definition (see Eq. (24)), Eq. (29) holds by Eq. (26),
Eq. (30) holds by the choice of λ, Eq. (31) holds by the choice of M , and Eq. (32)
holds by the choice of λ.
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Finally, the payoff in the modified game satisfies
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i;Di, ci)
= Es0,σi,σ−i
[∑
D∈Di
min
{
U iλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i;D), tλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i;D) · ci(D)
}]
(34)
≥
∑
D∈Di
∞∑
k=0
Es0,σi,σ−i
[
1
{τD
i
k
<∞}∩{D(s
τD
i
k
)=D}
· λτ
Di
k
−1· (35)
tλ(s0, σ; τ
Di
k , τ
Di
k+1)min{γ
i
λ(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1), c
i(D)}
]
≥
∑
D∈Di
∞∑
k=0
Es0,σi,σ−i
[
1
{τD
i
k
<∞}∩{D(s
τD
i
k
)=D}
tλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τD
i
k , τ
Di
k+1) · (v
i
1(sτDi
k
)− 3ε)
]
−2ε (36)
≥ vi1(s0)− 5ε− 2δ. (37)
where Eq. (34) holds by the definition of the modified payoff, Eq. (35) follows holds
since
min{a1, b1}+min{a2, b2} ≤ min{a1 + a2, b1 + b2}, ∀a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ R, (38)
Eq. (36) holds by Theorem 6.6, Eq. (27), and since ci(D) ≥ vi1(s) for every element
D ∈ Di and every state s ∈ D, and Eq. (37) holds since σi is δ-max-min preserving.
7 The Modified Game: the Min-Max Value
In Section 6 we studied the max-min value in the modified game. In the present
section we derive the analogous results with regards to the min-max value. The
proofs of these results are similar to the proofs regarding the max-min value, hence
omitted. The reason we started with the study of the max-min value is that while
player i has one strategy that guarantees that his payoff is at least his max-min
value minus ε, whatever the other players play, this is not the case for the min-max
value: for every strategy profile of the other players, player i may have a different
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strategy that guarantees that his payoff is at least the uniform min-max value
minus ε. This feature of the concept of the min-max value has the implication
that definitions and proofs are more cumbersome, yet they pose no new technical
difficulties.
The λ-discounted min-max value of player i at the initial state s0 in the original
stochastic game is given by
viλ(s0) := min
σ−i∈Σ−i
max
σi∈Σi
γiλ(s0; σ
i, σ−i). (39)
The interpretation of the min-max value is that the other players can ensure that
player i’s payoff will not be above his min-max value, and they cannot lower his
payoff further. Denote
vi1(s0) := lim
λ→1
viλ(s0),
which is termed the uniform min-max value of player i at the initial state s0.
Neyman (2003) proved that for every strategy profile of players I \ {i} player i
has a response that guarantees that his payoff is at least the uniform min-max
value minus ε, provided the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1 or the game
is sufficiently long. We will need this strategy to satisfy an additional condition,
which resembles the concept of being Markovian w.r.t. a partition. This condition
is complicated to formulate, since the strategy profile of players I \ {i} need not
be Markovian w.r.t. the partition. We therefore spell out directly the properties
that the response of player i should satisfy.
Denote by Di∗∗ the partition of the set of states S according to the uniform
min-max value of player i: two states s, s′ ∈ S are in the same element of the
partition if and only if vi1(s) = v
i
1(s
′). The next result follows from Neyman (2003)
together with the analog of Theorem 5.9.
Theorem 7.1 For every ε > 0, every player i ∈ I, and every initial state s0 ∈ S
there is N0 ∈ N such that for every strategy profile σ
−i ∈ Σ−i there is a strategy σi
such that for every N ≥ N0,
γiN(s0, σ
i, σ−i) ≥ vi1(s0)− ε. (40)
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Moreover, for every k ≥ 0 and every bounded stopping time τ ≥ τ
Di∗∗
k ,
vi1(sτD
i
∗∗
k
) ≤ Es
τ
Di∗∗
k
,σi
h
τ
Di∗∗
k
,σ−i
h
τ
Di∗∗
k
[vi1(sτ )] + ε,
and on the event
{
Es0,σi,σ−i [τ − τ
Di∗∗
k | H(τ
Di∗∗
k )] ≥ N0
}
we have
γi(s0, σ
i, σ−i; τ
Di∗∗
k , τ) ≥ v
i
1(sτD
i
∗∗
k
)− ε. (41)
Note that Eq. (41) requires some sort of uniform subgame perfectness: the
strategy profile σi is a good response in every subgame that starts when the play
switches an element of the partition Di∗∗. We will call a strategy σ
i that satisfies
Eqs. (40)–(41) for the partition Di∗∗ a uniform D
i
∗∗-subgame-perfect ε-min-max
strategy against σ−i.
The analog of Property P for the min-max value is the following.
Definition 7.2 Let i ∈ I be a player. A partition D of the set of states S satisfies
Property P’ w.r.t. player i if there is a real number ζ > 0 and for every ε > 0 and
every strategy profile σ−i ∈ Σ−i there are a uniform D-subgame-perfect ε-min-max
strategy σi ∈ Σi against σ−i and an event E such that Ps0,σi,σ−i(E) ≥ 1− ε and
Es0,σi,σ−i [Z · 1E] ≤ ζ.
The partitions in Examples 6.3 and 6.4 satisfy Property P’ w.r.t. all players.
Analogously to Example 6.5, for every player i ∈ I the partition Di∗∗ satisfies
Property P’ w.r.t. player i.
Denote by
v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) := min
σ−i∈Σ−i
max
σi∈Σi
γiλ(s0; σ
i, σ−i)
the min-max value of player i in the modified game Γ̂iλ(s0;
~D,~c). The following
result, which is analogous to Theorem 6.8, states that if the partition Di satisfies
Property P’ and if the vector ci ∈ RD
i
is at least the min-max value, then the limit
min-max value of player i in the modified game is his uniform min-max value at
the initial state in the original stochastic game.
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Theorem 7.3 Let Di be a partition of the set of states S that satisfies Property
P’ w.r.t. player i and let ci ∈ RD
i
satisfy ci(D) ≥ vi1(s) for every element D ∈ D
i
and every state s ∈ D. Then for every initial state s0 ∈ S the limit v̂
i
1(s0;D
i, ci) :=
limλ→1 v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) exists and satisfies v̂
i
1(s0;D
i, ci) = vi1(s0).
When particularized to absorbing games, Theorem 7.3 coincides with Step 2 in
the proof of Theorem 4.5 in Solan (1999).
Since the payoff to a player in an equilibrium is always at least his min-max
value, Theorem 7.3 yields that the limit of stationary equilibrium payoffs of each
player i in the modified game is at least his uniform min-max value in the original
stochastic game at the initial state.
Corollary 7.4 Fix an initial state s0 ∈ S, a vector of partitions ~D = (D
i)i∈I of
the set of states such that for every player i ∈ I the partition Di satisfies Property
P’ w.r.t. player i, and a vector ~c = (ci(D))i∈I,D∈Di ∈ R
I×D such that ci(D) ≥ vi1(s)
for every player i ∈ I, every element D ∈ Di, and every state s ∈ D. Let λ 7→ xλ be
a function that assigns to every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1) a stationary equilibrium
in the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c). Then lim infλ→1 γ̂
i
λ(s0, xλ;D
i, ci) ≥ vi1(s0).
8 The Min-Max Value in Stationary Strategies
In discounted stochastic games the min-max (resp. max-min) value of a player
when all players are restricted to stationary strategies coincides with his min-max
(resp. max-min) value without this restriction. In this section (resp. Section 9) we
study the min-max (resp. max-min) value in the modified game when the players
are restricted to stationary strategies, and check whether the above mentioned
phenomenon holds in the modified game. The motivation for this study is that
if one can prove that there exists a stationary strategy profile xλ that guarantees
that the payoff of each player in the modified game is at least his min-max value
(resp. max-min value), whatever be the initial state, and if the limit min-max
value (resp. max-min value) in stationary strategies in the modified game when
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the players are restricted to stationary strategies coincides with his uniform min-
max value (resp. uniform max-min value) in the original stochastic game, then we
may be able to derive results on the original stochastic game using the sequence
(xλ)λ∈[0,1).
The min-max value of player i in the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) when the
players are restricted to stationary strategies is
v̂
i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) := min
x−i∈Σ−istat
max
xi∈Σistat
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci). (42)
Since the payoff function γ̂iλ(s0, ·;D
i, ci) : Σ→ R is continuous, the min-max value
in stationary strategies is well-defined. In Eq. (42), the maximum and minimum
are over the set of stationary strategies of the players, hence both are smaller
than the sets considered for the calculation of the min-max value viλ(s0;D
i, ci).
Consequently, there is no clear comparison between the min-max value and the
min-max value in stationary strategies of the modified game. Nevertheless we
have the following result.
Theorem 8.1 For every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every
player i ∈ I, every partition Di of the set of states, and every vector ci ∈ RD
i
,
v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) ≤ v̂
i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) ≤ viλ(s). (43)
Proof. The left-hand side inequality in Eq. (43) holds due to the following
chain of equalities and inequalities:
v̂
i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) = min
x−i∈Σ−istat
max
xi∈Σistat
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci) (44)
= min
x−i∈Σ−istat
max
σi∈Σi
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, x−i;Di, ci) (45)
≥ min
σ−i∈Σ−i
max
σi∈Σi
γ̂iλ(s0, σ
i, σ−i;Di, ci) (46)
= v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci), (47)
where Eq. (45) follows from Theorem 4.2.
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We turn to prove the right-hand side inequality in Eq. (43). Because the
discounted min-max value in the original stochastic game is attained in stationary
strategies and by Eq. (5) we have
viλ(s0) = min
x−i∈Σ−istat
max
xi∈Σistat
γiλ(s0, x
i, x−i)
≥ min
x−i∈Σ−istat
max
xi∈Σistat
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci)
= v̂
i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci),
as claimed.
By taking the limits as λ goes to 1 in Eq. (43) and by using Theorem 7.3 we
obtain the following result.
Corollary 8.2 For every initial state s0 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I, every partition
Di of the set of states that satisfies Property P’ w.r.t. player i, and every vector
ci ∈ RD
i
that satisfies that ci(D) ≥ vi1(s) for every element D ∈ D
i and every state
s ∈ D, we have
lim
λ→1
v̂
i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) = lim
λ→1
v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci).
9 The Max-Min Value in Stationary Strategies
In this section we define the concept of max-min value in stationary strategies in
the modified game, and show that its behavior is different than the behavior of the
min-max value in stationary strategies.
The max-min value of player i in the modified game Γ̂λ(s0; ~D,~c) when the
players are restricted to stationary strategies is
v̂i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) := max
xi∈Σistat
min
x−i∈Σ−istat
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci).
We first show that the max-min value is not lowered when the other players
are allowed to play any strategy profile.
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Theorem 9.1 For every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every
player i ∈ I, every partition Di of the set of states, and every vector ci ∈ RD
i
,
v̂i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) = max
xi∈Σi
stat
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;Di, ci).
Theorem 9.1 follows from the following result, which states that when player i
plays a stationary strategy, the lowest payoff of player i in the modified game is
obtained when players I \ {i} play a pure stationary strategy profile.
Lemma 9.2 For every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every
player i ∈ I, every partition Di of the set of states, every vector ci ∈ RD
i
, every
stationary strategy xi ∈ Σistat, and every strategy profile σ
−i ∈ Σ−i of the other
players there is a pure stationary strategy profile x−i ∈ Σ−istat such that
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;Di, ci) ≥ γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−i;Di, ci).
Proof. When player i plays a stationary strategy and the other players are con-
ceived as a single decision maker who can correlate its |I| − 1 actions, the decision
problem of players I \ {i} becomes a Markov decision problem. By Altman (1999,
Theorem 3.2) there are L ∈ N, a probability distribution β ∈ ∆({1, 2, . . . , L}), and
a collection of pure stationary strategy profiles (x−il )
L
l=1 of all players other that
player i such that
tλ(s0, x
i, σ−i) =
L∑
l=1
βltλ(s0, x
i, x−il ).
By Eq. (2), for every element D ∈ Di,
U iλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;D) =
∑
s∈D,a∈A(s)
tλ(s0, x
i, σ−i; s, a)ui(s, a)
=
∑
s∈D,a∈A(s)
L∑
l=1
βltλ(s0, x
i, x−il )u
i(s, a)
=
L∑
l=1
βlU
i
λ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D).
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By Eq. (38) we have
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;Di, ci) =
∑
D∈Di
min
{
U iλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;D), tλ(s0, x
i, σ−i;D) · ci(D)
}
=
∑
D∈Di
min
{
L∑
l=1
βlU
i
λ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D),
L∑
l=1
βltλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D) · c
i(D)
}
≥
∑
D∈Di
L∑
l=1
βlmin
{
U iλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D), tλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D) · c
i(D)
}
=
L∑
l=1
βl
∑
D∈Di
min
{
U iλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D), tλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D) · c
i(D)
}
=
L∑
l=1
βlγ̂
i
λ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D
i, ci)
≥ min
l=1,··· ,L
γ̂iλ(s0, x
i, x−il ;D
i, ci),
and the desired result follows.
We can now prove that the max-min value in stationary strategies in the mod-
ified game is not larger than the max-min value in the modified game.
Theorem 9.3 For every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1), every initial state s0 ∈ S, every
player i ∈ I, every partition Di of the set of states, and every vector ci ∈ RD
i
,
v̂i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci) ≤ v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci). (48)
Proof. The claim follows from the following chain of equalities and inequality,
that holds due to Lemma 9.2.
v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci) = max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
γiλ(s0; σ
i, σ−i)
≥ max
xi∈Σistat
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
γiλ(s0; x
i, σ−i)
= max
xi∈Σistat
min
x−i∈Σ−istat
γiλ(s0; x
i, σ−i)
= v̂i
λ,stat(s0;D
i, ci).
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The following example shows that the inequality in Theorem 9.3 can be strict
and not vanish as the discount factor goes to 1.
Example 9.4 (The Big Match) The two-player zero-sum absorbing game that
appears in Figure 3 is a slight variation of the Big Match, which was introduced by
Gillette (1956) and analyzed by Blackwell and Ferguson (1968).
B
T
L R
s0
1, 0 s
1
0, 1 s
2
1, 0 s
0
0, 1 s
0
B
L
s1
0, 1 s
1
B
L
s2
1, 0 s
2
Figure 3: The game in Example 9.4.
Let D1 be the partition of S in which each state forms a distinct element:
D1 :=
{
{s0}, {s1}, {s2}
}
.
Let c1 be the vector composed of the uniform value of Player 1 in the various states:
c1({s0}) := 1
2
, c1({s1}) := 0, c1({s2}) := 1.
By Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) and Theorem 6.8,
v̂11(s0;D
1, c1) = v11(s0) =
1
2
.
We will show that the inequality in Theorem 9.3 can be strict by showing that
for every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1) we have
v̂1λ,stat(s
0;D1, c1) = 1
3
.
Any stationary strategy [p(T ), (1 − p)(B)] of Player 1 determines the total λ-
discounted time α that the play spends in s0 before it is absorbed. This λ-discounted
time is denoted by α = αλ(p) and is given by
αλ(p) = (1− λ) + λ(1− λ)(1− p) + λ
2(1− λ)(1− p)2 + · · ·
=
1− λ
1− λ(1− p)
. (49)
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The function p 7→ αλ(p) given in Eq. (9.4) is a monotone decreasing function
from [0, 1] to [1− λ, 1] and onto. It follows that
v̂1λ,stat(s
0;D1, c1) = max
x1∈Σ1stat
min
x2∈Σ2stat
γ̂1λ(s0, x
1, x2;D1, c1)
= max
α∈[1−λ,1]
min
y∈[0,1]
(
α ·min{1− y, 1
2
}+ (1− α)y
)
(50)
= 1
3
,
and the maximum in Eq. (50) is attained at α = 2
3
.
10 Application: Uniform Equilibrium in Strongly
Controllable Games
In this section we show that the modified game can be used to prove the existence of
a uniform ε-equilibrium in a certain class of multiplayer stochastic games. We start
by describing the class of games that we study. Call a set of states D closed if the
play cannot leave D, whatever the players play. Call the set D strongly controllable
if the play can leave D only when the play is in a specific state sD ∈ D, and a
specific player iD plays a specific action a˜
iD ; in all other states in D the play cannot
leave D, and when the play is in state sD and player iD plays an action that is not
a˜iD , the play cannot leave D.
Let D be the partition of the set of states according to the vector of uniform
min-max values of the players: two states are in the same element of the partition
if all players have the same uniform min-max values in the two states. Consider
the following refinement D∗ of D: two states s and s′ are in the same element of
D∗ if (a) they lie in the same element of D, (b) there is a strategy profile that
ensures that the play reaches s′ without leaving D when the initial state is s, and
(c) there is a strategy profile that ensure that the play reaches s without leaving
D when the initial state is s′. We call a stochastic game strongly controllable if
each element of the partition D∗ is either closed or strongly controllable.
We will prove that every strongly controllable multiplayer stochastic game ad-
mits a uniform equilibrium payoff. Admittedly, this class of games is restricted,
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yet the proof that is described below and shows that games in this class admit
a uniform ε-equilibrium, which involves the modified game, is the first to achieve
this task. An alternative way to prove the existence of a uniform ε-equilibrium in
this class of games uses the technique of Solan and Vieille (2002, Section 4).
Strongly controllable games are by no means significant in their own right.
The goal of this section is to show a proof of concept: the modified game can
be used to prove the existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff in some nontrivial
class of multiplayer stochastic games. We hope that in the future more convincing
applications to this tool will be found.
Definition 10.1 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ is a uniform ε-equilibrium if for
every initial state s0 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I, every integer N ∈ N sufficiently
large, and every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1) sufficiently close to 1,
γiλ(s0, σ
′i, σ−i) ≤ γiλ(s0, σ) + ε, ∀σ
′i ∈ Σi,
and
γiN(s0, σ
′i, σ−i) ≤ γiN(s0, σ) + ε, ∀σ
′i ∈ Σi.
The existence of a uniform ε-equilibrium has been verified for various classes
of stochastic games (see, e.g., Mertens and Neyman (1981), Solan (1999), Vieille
(2000a,b), Solan and Vieille (2001), Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (2007), Simon
(2007, 2012), and Flesch, Schoenmakers, and Vrieze (2008, 2009)). In this section
we concentrate on the class of strongly controllable stochastic games, which we
define now formally.
Definition 10.2 A set of states D ⊆ S is closed if q(D | s, a) = 1 for every
state s ∈ D and every action profile a ∈ A(s). A set of states D ⊆ S is strongly
controllable if the following condition holds: there is a player iD ∈ I, a state
sD ∈ D, and an action a˜
iD ∈ AiD(sD) such that for every state s ∈ D and every
action profile a ∈ A(s), if q(D | s, a) < 1 then s = sD and a
iD = a˜iD .
Let D be the partition of the set of states according to the uniform min-max
value vector: two states s, s′ ∈ S are in the same element of D if and only if
vi1(s) = v
i
1(s
′) for every player i ∈ I.
46
For every set C ⊆ S denote by νC the first arrival time to C:
νC := min{n ≥ 0: sn ∈ C}.
By convention, the minimum of an empty set is +∞.
Definition 10.3 Let D ⊆ S be a set of states and let s, s′ ∈ D. We say that state
s leads in D to state s′ if there is a strategy profile σ such that under σ the play
reaches s′ before leaving D when the initial state is s:
Ps,σ(ν{s′} < νS\D) = 1. (51)
The states s and s′ are D-siblings if each one leads in D to the other.
If there is a strategy profile σ that satisfies Eq. (51), then there is a pure
stationary strategy profile that satisfies this equation, and, moreover, this strategy
profile is independent of s, as soon as s ∈ D. By definition, every state leads to
itself in any set D that contains it. As a result, the D-siblings relation is reflexive,
commutative, and transitive. The following result states that if the states s and s′
are D-siblings, and if s′′ is a state that is visited with positive probability under
the strategy that leads in D from s to s′, then the states s′ and s′′ are D-siblings
as well.
Lemma 10.4 Let D ⊆ S be a set of states, let s, s′ ∈ D, and let σ be a strategy
profile that satisfies Eq. (51). Let s′′ ∈ D be a state that satisfies Ps,σ(ν{s′′} <
ν{s′}) > 0. If s and s
′ are D-siblings, then s′ and s′′ are D-siblings.
Proof. The part of σ from its first visit to s′′ until the play reaches s′ is a
strategy profile that leads from s′′ to s′ without leaving D.
We now prove that there is a strategy profile that ensures that the play reaches
s′′ without leaving D when the initial state is s′. Let σ′ be a strategy profile that
ensures that the play reaches state s without leaving D when the initial state is
s′. Let σ′′ be the strategy profile in which the players alternately follow σ′ until
the play reaches s and then they follow σ until the play reaches s′. By definition,
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under σ′′ the play never leaves D, that is, Ps′,σ′′(νS\D = ∞) = 1. We claim that
under σ′′ the play reaches s′′ with probability 1, that is, Ps′,σ′′(ν{s′′} < ∞) = 1.
Indeed, after each visit to s, with probability Ps,σ(ν{s′′} < ν{s′}) the play reaches
state s′′ before reaching state s′, hence the play eventually reaches state s′′ a.s.
Two states s, s′ are D-siblings if they are D-siblings for some element D ∈
D. Denote by D∗ the partition of the set of states according to the D-siblings
equivalence relation. This partition is a refinement of the partition D. Lemma 10.4
implies that if the states s and s′ lie in the same element of the partition D∗, then
state s leads to state s′ without leaving the element of D∗ that contains both states
s and s′.
Definition 10.5 A stochastic game is strongly controllable if all elements D ∈ D∗
are either closed or strongly controllable.
Closed sets of states resemble repeated games, since the play cannot leave such
a set, can move between the states, and the min-max value is independent of the
state. Consequently, whenever the initial state is in a closed set of states, a uniform
ε-equilibrium exists. In fact, in this case a folk theorem obtains, and every feasible
and individually rational payoff vector is a uniform equilibrium payoff, namely a
limit as ε goes to 0 of payoff vectors that correspond to uniform ε-equilibria. The
main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 10.6 Every strongly controllable stochastic game Γ admits a uniform
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 10.6, which uses the
approach of Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) and Solan (1999), and, except of the use
of the modified game, is by now standard. We will therefore provide the main lines
of the proof without getting into all the details.
Fix ε > 0 throughout, and for the time being also fix an element D ∈ D∗.
Step 1: Definition of a restricted stochastic game and its modified game.
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Consider the stochastic game ΓD that is derived from the stochastic game Γ by
restricting the set of states to D; that is,
• The set of players is I.
• The set of states is S; all states s 6∈ D are absorbing with absorbing payoff
v1(s).
• The set of actions of each player i in each state s ∈ D is Ai(s).
• Transitions and stage payoff in states in D are as in the original stochastic
game.
If D is a closed set of states, let sD be an arbitrary state in D; if D is a strongly
controllable set, the state sD was defined in Definition 10.2. Define a partition DD
over the set of states S by
DD := {D, {s}s 6∈D},
and for every player i ∈ I define a vector of cut-offs (ci(E))E∈DD by
ciD(D) := v
i
1(sD), c
i
D({s}) := v
i
1(s) ∀s 6∈ D.
Since the set D contains all nonabsorbing states in the game ΓD, the partition
DD satisfies Property P’ w.r.t. every player with ζ = 1 (see the paragraph after
Definition 7.2).
Consider the modified game Γ̂Dλ (sD;DD,~cD) that is based on the restricted
stochastic game ΓD, where all players share the same partition DD, and the vector
of cutoffs is ~c := (ciD)i∈I . For every λ ∈ [0, 1) let xλ be a stationary equilibrium in
the modified game Γ̂Dλ (sD;DD,~cD) such that the function λ 7→ xλ is semi-algebraic
(see Theorem 4.11). In particular the limit x1(s) := limλ→1 xλ(s) exists for every
state s ∈ S, and by Corollary 7.4 we have
lim
λ→1
γ̂iλ(s0, xλ;DD, c
i
D) ≥ v
i
1(sD). (52)
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The payoff in the modified game Γ̂Dλ (sD;DD,~cD) under the strategy profile xλ
is
γ̂
D,i
λ (sD, xλ;DD, v
i
1) =
∑
E∈D
min
{
U iλ(sD, xλ;E), tλ(s0, xλ;E) · c
i
D(E)
}
(53)
= min
{
U iλ(sD, xλ;D), tλ(sD, xλ;D) · v
i
1(sD)
}
+
∑
s 6∈D
tλ(sD, xλ; {s}) · v
i
1(s).
By taking the limit as λ goes to 1 in Eq. (53) and using Eq. (52) we deduce that
exactly one of the following alternatives hold:
(A.1) limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) = 1 and limλ→1 U
i
λ(sD, xλ;D) ≥ v
i
1(sD) for every player
i ∈ I.
(A.2) limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) < 1 and
∑
s 6∈D tλ(sD, xλ; {s}) · v
i
1(s) ≥ v
i
1(sD) for every
player i ∈ I.
The significance of the modified game is in implying this dichotomy. We will show
that if for D ∈ D∗ Condition (A.1) holds, then when the initial state is in D there
is a uniform ε-equilibrium under which the play never leaves D, while if Condition
(A.2) holds, then when the initial state is in D there is a uniform ε-equilibrium
under which the play leaves D with probability 1.
Step 2: Condition (A.1) holds.
The condition limλ→1 tλ(sD, σ;D) = 1 arises in two cases:
• The set D is closed, and in particular the play cannot leave it.
• The setD is strongly controllable, and as λ goes to 1 the λ-discounted time at
which the play leaves D under xλ goes to 0: limλ→1Es0,xλ[(1− λ)λ
νS\D ] = 0.
Both cases are treated in the same way.
Since all states in the set D are D-siblings (Lemma 10.4), for every state s′ ∈ D
there is a stationary strategy profile that ensures that the play reaches state s′
without leaving D when the initial state is in D. If tλ(sD, σ; {s
′}) > 0 for every
λ ∈ [0, 1), that is, the λ-discounted time spent in state s′ is positive 0, then there is
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a stationary strategy profile that is a perturbation of x1 and ensures that the play
reaches s′ without leaving D when the initial state is in D. Formally, for every
δ > 0 there is a stationary strategy profile yδ,s′ that satisfies
• The strategy profile yδ,s′ is a perturbation of x1, that is, ‖y
i
δ,s′(s)−x
i
1(s)‖∞ < δ
for every player i ∈ I and every state s ∈ D.
• Under the strategy profile yδ,s′ the play reaches state s
′ with probability 1
without leaving D, provided the initial state is in D:
Ps,yδ,s′ (ν{s′} < νS\D) = 1, ∀s ∈ D.
Since limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) = 1, Eq. (4) implies that
lim
λ→1
U iλ(sD, xλ;D) = lim
λ→1
γiλ(sD, xλ),
hence Condition (A.1) implies that
lim
λ→1
γiλ(sD, xλ) ≥ v
i
1(sD), ∀i ∈ I.
The quantity limλ→1 γλ(sD, xλ) is a convex combination of the payoff under the
stationary strategy profile x1 in its irreducible sets. Recall that a nonempty set
C ⊆ S is irreducible under x1 if
(I.1) The set C is closed under x1, that is, q(C | s, x1) = 1 for every state s ∈ C.
(I.2) The set C is a minimal set (w.r.t. set inclusion) that satisfies property (I.1).
Denote by I(D; x1) the collection of all irreducible sets under x1 that are con-
tained in D. It is well known that for every irreducible set C under x1 the limit
limλ→1 γλ(s0, x1) is independent of the initial state s0, as long as s0 is in C. We
denote this limit by γ1(C, x1). For every irreducible set C under x1 denote the λ-
discounted time that the play spends in the set C under strategy profile xλ when
the initial state is sD by
β(C) := lim
λ→1
tλ(sD, xλ;C).
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Then
lim
λ→1
γiλ(sD, xλ) =
∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1).
Denote supp (β) = {C1, C2, · · · , CL} and for each l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} choose a state
sl ∈ Cl.
Consider the following strategy profile σK that depends on a positive real num-
ber K:
1. Set l = 1.
2. The players play the stationary strategy profile yε,sl until the play reaches a
state in Cl.
3. The players play the stationary strategy profile x1 for ⌈β(Cl) ·K⌉ stages.
4. Increase l by 1 modulo L and go to Step 2.
The reader can verify that as K increases the payoff under σK converges to∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1), that is,
lim
K→∞
lim
λ→1
γiλ(sD, σK) =
∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1),
and
lim
K→∞
lim
N→∞
γiN(sD, σK) =
∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1).
It is standard to verify that by adding statistical tests to σK , which check whether
the players indeed follow it, the strategy profile σK can be turned into a uniform
2ε-equilibrium, provided the initial state is in D.
Choose K0 ∈ N sufficiently large such that∣∣∣∣∣∣limλ→1 γiλ(sD, σK0)−
∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
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and ∣∣∣∣∣∣ limN→∞ γiN(sD, σK0)−
∑
C∈I(D;x1)
β(C) · γ1(C, x1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Step 3: Condition (A.2) holds.
The condition limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) < 1 implies that the play can leave D, hence
in particular the set D is not closed, and therefore it is strongly controllable. By
Condition (A.2),∑
s 6∈D
lim
λ→1
tλ(sD, xλ; {s}) · v
i
1(s) ≥ v
i
1(sD), ∀i ∈ I,
and therefore
lim
λ→1
(∑
s′ 6∈D q(s
′ | sD, a˜
iD , x−iDλ ) · v
i
1(s
′)
q(S \D | sD, a˜iD , x
−iD
λ )
)
≥ vi1(sD), ∀i ∈ I.
A strategy profile that ensures that the play leaves the set D and the expected
continuation uniform min-max value is high suggests itself. Fix λ0 ∈ [0, 1) that
satisfies ∑
s′ 6∈D q(s
′ | sD, a˜
iD , x−iDλ0 ) · v
i
1(s
′)
q(S \D | sD, a˜iD , x
−iD
λ0
)
≥ vi1(sD)− δ, ∀i ∈ I,
where δ > 0 will be determined below.
• The players play a pure stationary strategy that guarantees that the play
reaches the state sD.
• At state sD players I \{iD} play x
−iD
λ0
, while player iD plays (1−η)â
iD+ηa˜iD ,
where âiD is some action in AiD(sD) \ {a˜
iD}, and η > 0 is sufficiently small.
• Deviations in states in D \ {sD} are observed immediately and punished at
the deviator’s uniform min-max level.
• Deviations in sD of players in I \ {iD} are observed statistically, provided η
is sufficiently small.
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• If the play has not left D after 1
η2
visits to state sD and no deviation has
been detected, all players start punishing player iD at his uniform min-max
level. The constant η is chosen sufficiently small so that if no player deviates,
the probability that the play does not leave D after 1
η2
visits to state sD is
smaller than δ.
Step 4: Combining the strategies.
Denote by σ∗ the strategy profile that plays as follows:
• Whenever the play enters an elementD ∈ D∗ that satisfies limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) =
1, the strategy profile σ∗ follows the strategy profile σK0 defined in Step 2.
• Whenever the play enters an elementD ∈ D∗ that satisfies limλ→1 tλ(sD, xλ;D) <
1, the strategy profile σ∗ follows the strategy profile defined in Step 3 until
the play leaves the set D.
The strategy profiles defined in Step 2 ensures that, when the initial state is in
an element D ∈ D∗ that satisfies Condition (A.1), the discounted payoff and the
average payoff of each player i is at least vi1(sD)− 2δ, provided the discount factor
is sufficiently close to 1 and the horizon is sufficiently long. The strategy profile
defined in Step 3 ensures that, when the initial state is in an element D ∈ D∗ that
satisfies Condition (A.2), the play leaves D and the expected continuation uniform
min-max value of each player i is at least vi1(sD) − δ. Note that for every player
i ∈ I, the strategy σ∗i is DD-Markovian.
Recall that k(D∗;n) is the number of times in which the play switched elements
of the partition D∗ up to stage n. For each player i ∈ I define a stochastic process
(Wn)n≥0 with values in R
I by W in := v
i
1(sn) + δ · k(D
∗;n) for each i ∈ I and every
n ≥ 0. By the construction of the strategy profile σ∗, the process (W in)n≥0 is a
bounded submartingale under the strategy profile σ∗, for every player i ∈ I.
We argue that the expected number of times in which the play switches between
elements of D∗ is bounded by a constant that is independent of δ. Indeed, the
proof of Theorem 5.7 implies that the number of times in which the play switches
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between elements of D is bounded by C(ρ). Moreover, if s, s′ are two states in
the same elements of D but in different elements of D∗, then one of them does
not lead to the other. It follows that the expected number of times in which the
process changes an element of the partition D∗ before leaving the current element
of the partition D is uniformly bounded by a constant C ′ that depends only on
the transition function q. The claim follows.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.7 we deduce that there is an event E that satisfies
the following conditions:
• Ps0,σ∗(E) ≥ 1− ε for every initial state s0.
• On the event E the number of times the process (Wk)k≥0 changes its values
is uniformly bounded, say by C ′′, which depends on ρ and on the transition
function q.
We choose δ sufficiently small such that C ′′δ ≤ ε.
We deduce thatPs0,σ∗-a.s. the play reaches a closed element inD
∗, and therefore
the expected long-run average payoff of each player i under σ∗ is at least vi1(s0)−3ε.
Moreover, for every history hn ∈ H the expected long-run average payoff of each
player i under σ∗, conditioned that history hn occurred, is at least v
i
1(sn) − 3ε.
This in turn implies that the strategy profile σ∗ is uniform 4ε-equilibrium.
11 Discussion and Open Problems
In this paper we defined for every stochastic game an auxiliary game, which we
termed the modified game, studied some of its properties, and showed that equilib-
ria in this auxiliary game can be used to study uniform equilibrium in the original
stochastic game. This approach is similar to the vanishing discount factor approach
of Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989), who studied uniform equilibrium in two-player
absorbing games by analyzing an auxiliary game, which, in their case, was the
discounted game. Solan (1999) took this approach one step further by studying
a more involved version of the payoff function in absorbing games, by altering
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the payoff function in the nonabsorbing state. In the present paper we extended
Solan’s (1999) approach to general stochastic games. Vieille (2000b), Solan (2000),
and Solan and Vieille (2002) studied another type of auxiliary game when the un-
derlying game is a recursive game by restricting the players to completely mixed
strategies.
Unlike Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989), Solan (1999), Vieille (2000b), Solan (2000),
and Solan and Vieille (2002), the auxiliary game presented in this paper is valid for
every stochastic game, and not only for absorbing games or for recursive games.
It is probable that our modified game is not the only auxiliary game that can be
useful to studying general stochastic games, and that in the future other types of
auxiliary games will be proposed and studied.
Example 4.10 shows that there need not be a stationary strategy profile x that
satisfies Eq. (6) for every player i ∈ I and every initial state s0 ∈ S. We do not
know whether for every ε > 0 there exists a stationary strategy profile x that
satisfies
γ̂iλ(s0, x;D
i, ci) ≥ vi1(s0)− ε, ∀i ∈ I, s0 ∈ S.
The existence of such a stationary strategy profile may have significant implications
on the study of acceptability in stochastic games (Solan, 2016) and on the study
of uniform correlated ε-equilibrium in stochastic games (Solan and Vieille, 2002;
Solan and Vohra, 2002).
As mentioned before, we do not know whether the functions λ 7→ v̂iλ(s0;D
i, ci)
and λ 7→ v̂
i
λ(s0;D
i, ci) are semi-algebraic for every initial state s0 ∈ S, every player
i ∈ I, every partition Di of the set of states, and every vector ci ∈ RD
i
. It is
interesting to know whether this is indeed the case, and if not, whether the limits
of these functions as the discount factor goes to 1 nevertheless exist.
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